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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
by
Emmett Colvin, Jr.*
D UE PRIMARILY to decisions of the federal judiciary, recent years
have seen dynamic changes in the field of criminal law. As an appar-
ent bulwark against this so-called excessive federalism, judicial procrasti-
nation by many states, including Texas, is still evident. The passage of the
Omnibus Crime Bill' may be directly credited to the congressional reaction
to this encroachment of federalism. It is important to note, however, that
the primary obstacle to law enforcement lies in the inability of the local
police to apprehend criminals and clear crimes after their occurrence. For
example, the clearance rate in Dallas, Texas, in 1967 was 30.07 per cent.'
Of those charged with felony offenses, at least eighty per cent pleaded guil-
ty and the number of convictions that are appealed and subsequently re-
versed is infinitesimal.' Statistics such as these are directly attributable to
the lack of resources made available to law enforcement authorities. Until
communities are willing to provide policemen with higher pay (including
state civil service) and better training, and to invest in modern means of
detection and communication, police effectiveness cannot be expected to
increase. The Supreme Court of the United States, though oft-criticized
for the coddling of criminals, is acutely aware of this major problem. In
recent decisions the Court has acted very favorably toward law enforce-
ment in the investigative area.'
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Most of the important decisions during the past year dealing with search
and seizure have been decided by the federal courts. The impact of these
cases on state law is nevertheless significant, and where possible these de-
cisions have been related to Texas law.
Stop and Frisk. Where the object of the search is not directed toward the
acquisition of criminal evidence the recent federal decisions have eroded
the necessity for probable cause. While the opinions may represent a whole-
some and well-balanced innovation in the law of search and seizure, they
must be carefully applied. In Terry v. Ohio,' a concealed weapon was
* LL.B., University of Arkansas, Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author is indebted to his
wife, co-author of Search and Seizure, Institute of The University of Texas (1968).
' Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 100, 82 Stat. 197
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 28, 42, 47 U.S.C.).
2ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DALLAS POLICE DEPT. FOR 1967, at 40.
'The Annual Report of Henry Wade, District Attorney, Dallas County, Texas, for 1967 re-
flects a total of 474 jury trials in all felony courts compared to a total of 3,746 pleas of guilty
in all such courts for the same period.
4Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
5 3 9 2 U.S. 1 (1968).
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seized after a police officer concluded from observing the conduct of Terry
and his companions that they were "casing" a job for a robbery and that
an investigation was necessary. After continued observation over a lengthy
period of time, the officer stopped the men and, fearing that they might
have a gun, frisked the outside of their garments. The weapon that was
removed from Terry was admitted into evidence over Terry's objections.
The trial court recognized that there was no probable cause for an arrest
but took the position that to protect himself it was reasonable for the
officer to interrogate the suspect and pat his outer garments. The court at-
tempted to distinguish between restraint of a person and seizure of a per-
son. The Supreme Court, however, recognized that such a distinction was a
mere play on words and accepted the fact that the person had been seized
and that the fourth amendment had full application. The question thus
presented was "whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize
a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is
probable cause for an arrest. '" The reasonableness of the search is deter-
mined by a dual inquiry-whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception and whether this action was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the initial interference. The Court set out
the correct approach to take in answering these questions. (1) To justify
such an interference the police officer must be able to articulate facts
which, coupled with rational inferences from such facts, reasonably war-
ranted such an intrusion. In making this assessment, it is imperative that
the facts be tested by an objective standard: Did the facts available to the
officer at the moment of search or seizure warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that such action was appropriate? (2) When the
officer is justified in believing that the suspicious person he is about to in-
vestigate is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it
would be unreasonable to deny the officer the power to determine whether
or not the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the poten-
tial threat. (3) The search for weapons in the absence of probable cause
to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed
by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Its extent must be limited
to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be
used to harm the officer or others nearby.
In Peters v. New York' and Sibron v. New York' the Supreme Court
further noted that the search must remain something less than a full
search. Unanswered, however, is the question of whether things such as
narcotics or burglary tools would be admissible into evidence if discovered
during a search for weapons.
Under article 14.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, any
police officer may arrest, without warrant, persons found in suspicious
places and under conditions which reasonably show that such persons have
committed or threatened to commit a felony or breach of the peace. The
old. at 15.
7 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
8392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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Supreme Court considered a similar statute in Sibron. There the Court held
that such a statute did not diminish the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. It would appear, therefore, that the Texas statute gives no particular
power to an officer in addition to that he already possesses under Terry.
Nevertheless, in Henderson v. State' the Texas court of criminal appeals
relied upon the statute rather than the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the fourth amendment to justify an officer's arrest of a person for being
drunk in a public place.
Electronic Surveillance. Assume that two people are speaking in confiden-
tial tones in a public park, under circumstances that would normally cause
them to believe that the communication is a private one. Unknown to
them at the time, however, there is an intruder to their conversation in the
upper story of a hotel recording their conversation through the use of a
telescopic microphone. Tested under prior decisions, their conversation
would not be protected because they were not in a constitutionally pro-
tected area. The Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States'° rep-
resents a major victory for their right of privacy. F.B.I. agents found that
Katz often used a certain public telephone at a particular location and at
certain times to transmit wagering information. The agents installed a bug
on the booth which was used only when Katz was in the booth. The Court
held that when a person seeks to preserve a conversation as private, "even
in an area accessible to the public,"" the conversation will be constitution-
ally protected under the fourth amendment. The Court clearly indicated
that it would have approved this type of eavesdropping if prior judicial
approval had been obtained, emphasizing the narrow circumstances under
which the surveillance was conducted and the fact that no conversation
of innocent persons was overheard. Since no warrant was obtained, how-
ever, Katz's conviction was reversed.
In Lee v. Florida" police officers had a party line installed in order to
overhear and record conversations of the defendant. The defendant pre-
viously had ordered telephone service and was informed that no private
lines were available. The police, using special equipment, had continuous
access to all of the defendant's calls and eliminated the tell-tale "click"
that might otherwise appraise the conversing parties that someone was on
the line. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, held that
the Federal Communications Act" proscribed the divulging of an inter-
cepted communication and that the statute applied to the states as well as
private individuals. The Court rejected any distinction between this case
and the fact situation in Rathbun v. United States,4 where the conversa-
tion was overheard with the consent of one of the conversing parties.
422 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
0389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11Id. at 351.
2392 U.S. 378 (1968).
"047 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
14355 U.S. 107 (1957).
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Schwartz v. Texas,"5 holding that state courts were not required to reject
evidence gathered in violation of the Act, was held overruled by Mapp
v. Ohio," which applied the exclusionary rule to all illegal searches and
seizures. Strong dissents were written by Justices Black, White, and Harlan
on the ground that the majority was acting as a supervisory power over
state courts.
It is difficult to understand why the Court did not rely on Katz. The
fact that a party line user's privacy is vulnerable does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that conversing parties might not seek to preserve their
conversations as private. Such an approach seems more appropriate than
the reliance upon a federal statute which is subject to amendment or
change.
It seems well established' 7 that the use of an eavesdropping device wired
to an informer for the purpose of recording the informer's conversation
with a suspect is constitutionally permissible. The eavesdropping must be
carefully circumscribed, however, and limited to specific conversations
which the eavesdropper knew would take place. Berger v. New York"
voiced disapproval of the indiscriminate seizure of conversations of inno-
cent people, when such conversations are overheard in a continuous opera-
tion over a lengthy period of time. Pursuant to a court order obtained
under a New York statute, a tape recorder was planted in an office sus-
pected of being used by persons involved in a conspiracy relating to the
issuance of liquor licenses. Part of the conversations recorded were played
back at the trial of Berger. His conviction was reversed by the Supreme
Court on the ground that the statute authorizing the "plant" was uncon-
stitutional. The statute did not require a particular description of the con-
versations sought to be recorded; it allowed the eavesdropping to be con-
tinuous over an indeterminate period of time, and it did not provide for
notice as in ordinary warrants.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Bill" authorizes wiretapping and eaves-
dropping orders for thirty-day periods. A title III bug or tap normally
will be a continuous operation which will inescapably pick up all conversa-
tions in the area. Thus, not only is the privacy of the telephone user in-
vaded with respect to those calls relating to the offense, but all other calls
are overheard. In addition, all persons who respond to the telephone user's
calls have their conversations overheard. It appears that such wiretapping
or eavesdropping represents a sweeping intrusion into the private and con-
'5 344 U.S. 199 (1952), holding that state trial courts were not required to reject evidence
violative of § 605.
"367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
A federal district court for the District of Columbia, however, recently decided that an in-
former's consent to the government's monitoring of the informer's conversation with a suspect is no
substitute for the prior consent of a judge to the interception of such conversation. The court
viewed Osborn as resting upon the prior judicial determination of reasonableness and not upon the
conversation being recorded with the consent of one party, the informant. Were this extremely
broad view generally followed it would appear to eliminate informants testifying aided by any
transcript of any government monitoring. United States v. Jones, Crim. No. 40-66 (D.D.C., Sept.
30, 1968).
8388 U.S. 41 (1967).
"Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. 1968).
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stitutionally protected conversations of innocent as well as guilty persons,
thereby assuming the character of a general search. Title III further suf-
fers from the fundamental deficiency that a warrant for electronic sur-
veillance cannot possibly describe particularly the conversations to be over-
heard." While it is true that title III requires a finding of probable cause,
this requirement has little actual effect. The lengthy period of surveillance
authorized by the Act belies the apparent adherence to any requirement
of particularity. Such an indiscriminate search, even under the authority of
a valid warrant, has been soundly condemned by the Supreme Court. It is
inconceivable, for example, that a search warrant could constitutionally
authorize an officer to enter a private home and search for a period of
thirty days or that it could authorize that anything written by a person
in the thirty-day period could be seized with the hope that incriminating
evidence could be obtained. It is clear that title III ranges far beyond the
tightly drawn requirements of Katz and Berger.
Consent To Search. In Bumper v. North Carolina,"5 officers asked to search
the house in which Bumper lived with his grandmother, stating that they
had a search warrant. The reliance for the lawfulness of the search, how-
ever, was placed upon the grandmother's consent" rather than the war-
rant (it was never shown that a warrant actually existed). The Supreme
Court held that the consent was involuntary as a matter of law since it
was given only after the officers had stated that they had a search war-
rant. While courts have heretofore recognized that a claim of official au-
thority is a factor to be considered strongly against a finding of volun-
tariness, Bumper appears to go further, making such a claim of authority
a controlling factor.
In some areas there is emerging a Miranda-type warning as a prerequi-
site to a valid consent to search. In United States v. Moderackia the de-
fendant had been fully warned of his Miranda rights before a search of
his person was made. He was not, however, warned that he need not sub-
mit to a search or that anything found on his person might be used against
him in evidence. He was then requested to empty his pockets, which he
did. A federal district court held that without such a warning the defend-
ant did not waive his fourth amendment rights.'
" The Supreme Court emphasized in Berger and Katz that the requirements of the fourth
amendment are applicable to wiretapping and eavesdropping and that these requirements are the
same as those applied to conventional search warrants. It is rather well established that conventional
warrants must describe with particularity an object to be seized and that a judge authorizing the
issuance of such a warrant must have cause to believe that the described object will be found on
the premises searched.
2
'391 U.S. 543 (1968).
" For an excellent discussion of the consent by a person other than the defendant, see CRIMINAL
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 146-54 (J. Reed, V. Nordin, A. Sugarman, J. Rice, eds. 1968).
23280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968).
24In the 1966 case of United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966), it was
suggested that a pre-search warning might not be necessary if it could otherwise be shown that
the defendant had full knowledge of his rights. This, of course, does not comport with the Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), doctrine of refusing to inquire into the defendant's awareness
of his constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit, citing Blalock, held, in United States v. NiKrasch,
367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966), that, at least where the defendant was in custody at the time of
consent, a specific warning of his fourth amendment rights was necessary. With a split in the cir-
1969]
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Probable Cause. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Aguilar v. Texas'
the execution of the affidavit in Texas in support of the search warrant
amounted to nothing more than a mere conclusion as to probable cause.
The device was so widespread that the affidavit appeared in printed form
in many areas of the state, relating merely that the facts contained in the
affidavit came from an unknown but reliable, credible, and truthful citi-
zen of "X" county. There were no allegations of fact from which the mag-
istrate could conceivably determine reliability. It now appears clear that
each affidavit must set out in detail the facts giving rise to probable
cause. That this is not an insurmountable problem may be noted by a re-
view of the affidavit appearing in the footnotes to the 1960 case of Jones
v. United States." The affidavit based solely upon an informant without
subsequent corroboration must consist of two major parts: (1) the
personal knowledge of the informant, and (2) the previous reliable in-
formation furnished by the informant. In Jones the Supreme Court held
that these requirements were not met by stating a mere conclusion. How-
ever, a review of affidavits supporting search warrants in Texas today
reveals rather consistent use of terminology such as "the above informant
has furnished information in the past on numerous occasions which proved
to be correct." It thus appears that there is developing another pre-Aguilar
"form" affidavit to avoid revealing to the magistrate "information" from
which he can judge reliability. Whether or not this technique will be ul-
timately sustained by the federal courts is subject to question. In applying
the Aguilar test, the Second Circuit in the 1966 case of United States v.
Warden27 struck down the warrant because the affidavit did not contain a
statement that the informant spoke from personal knowledge. Warden
was recently quoted with approval by the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. Davis." Both decisions recognized the validity of affidavits based on
hearsay but viewed Aguilar as requiring that the magistrate be advised of
the underlying circumstances from which the informant made his con-
clusions.
In Schutz v. United States2 the affidavit recited that the affiants had
received information from a reliable source that Schutz had just returned
from San Antonio, Texas, with a large quantity of heroin, that the in-
formant had, in the past, provided the officers with reliable information,
that a large number of known addicts had been observed going and com-
ing from Schutz's house, and that Schutz was trafficking in narcotics.
The Tenth Circuit held that the affidavit met the test of Aguilar, relying
on the previous decisions of United States v. Ventresca5 and McCray v.
Illinois.1 Reliance upon McCray, however, seems misplaced, since there the
cuits, the practitioner would be amiss if he did not raise the Miranda rationale in each motion to
suppress an objection to search (one can always be alert for the "consent dragon" to raise its
head at any time).
'2378 U.S. 108 (1964).
26362 U.S. 257 (1960).
27 381 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1967).
28402 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1968).
55395 F.2d 255 (loth Cir. 1968).
so380 U.S. 109 (1965).
31386 U.S. 300 (1967).
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affidavit stated that the police had known the informant for about two
years, that the informant had given them information about twenty or
twenty-five times, and that the information had resulted in a conviction.
It would appear that the court in Schutz gave additional consideration to
facts peculiarly within the affiant's personal knowledge and accepted the
statement concerning Schutz's return from San Antonio as the needed
corroboration.
It has become somewhat customary in many parts of the country to
describe the principal by name in the search warrant and affidavit and
then to add "and person or persons unknown" despite the fact that
no information is known concerning any other persons. The problem be-
comes evident in light of the customary practice of tacking a warrant
for arrest to the search warrant. In executing the warrant, officers fre-
quently arrest and search all persons on the premises (as well as persons
coming into the dwelling while the search is in progress) without any
particular regard to the sequence, purpose, or order of events. In one case"
a New York court held that an officer could not search a person not named
specifically in the warrant. But a Georgia statute" which authorized the
search of any person in the dwelling if the officer believed it reasonably
necessary to protect himself from attack or to prevent disposal or conceal-
ment of evidence described in the warrant, was held to be constitutional
by the Georgia Supreme Court.' The contention that the statute was un-
constitutional because it authorized a search without probable cause and
without describing the person to be searched was rejected.
Texas has statutory authorization for inclusion of an arrest warrant
in the search warrant." Nevertheless, as the previous cases indicate, the
arrest and search of a person upon the premises must be conducted within
the constitutional commands of probable cause or the limited application
of the stop and frisk doctrine.
Standing To Complain. It appears that the scope of standing to complain
of an illegal search and seizure is moving even further from the old prop-
erty interest concept. In Berger v. New YorVz the petitioner was never
present in one of the offices where eavesdropping was being conducted.
While the majority of the Supreme Court passed upon the constitutionality
of the eavesdropping statute, Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, took
"ePeople v. Smith, 21 N.Y.2d 698, 234 N.E.2d 460, 287 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1967).
5AGA. CODE ANN. § 27-309 (Supp. 1968).
"
4 Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 160 S.E.2d 368 (1968). See also United States v. Haywood, 284
F. Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1968), where it was held that a warrant authorizing a search of a residence
did not authorize a search of a person. The officer patted down the defendant and discovered cap-
sules-known not to be weapons (see "Stop and Frisk" rationale). This did not authorize the re-
moval of the capsules from the person of the defendant on the belief that such capsules were heroin
(later established to be heroin). Compare Doby v. State, 363 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
According to a New Hampshire decision, merely because a person is found in a room at a time
when the room is being searched under a valid search warrant does not justify such a search of
the person on the basis of mere presence in the room. In this instance the warrant had been issued
to search a women's dormitory room and the one searched was not the girl to whom the room
had been assigned. State v. Bradbury, 243 A.2d 302 (N.H. 1968).
'TEx. CODE CIUM. PRoc. ANN. art. 18.11 (1966).
86 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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the position that Berger had no standing to contest the search in that of-
fice. But Justice Harlan, although also dissenting, stated that:
However oblique this invasion of petitioner's personal privacy might at first
seem, it would entirely suffice, in my view, to afford petitioner standing to
challenge the validity of [the search] .... The central question should prop-
erly be whether his privacy has been violated by the search; it is enough for
this purpose that he participated in a discussion into which the recording
intruded.
Thus it seems that a participatory interest is being woven into the pattern
of standing.
The participatory interest issue was raised in the case of Mancusi v.
DeForte.3' There the prosecutor caused to be issued a subpoena duces tecum
to the Teamsters local for the production of certain records. After the
union refused to comply, a search was conducted and certain material was
seized from the union office. Since the subpoena did not confer the right
to seize property, it could not qualify as a valid search warrant and a
search without a warrant was, of course, unreasonable. But aside from the
reasonableness of the search was the question of whether the defendant-
a union official who spent "a considerable amount of time" in the office-
had standing to object to the seizure. In an opinion written by Justice
Harlan the Court held that the union official did have sufficient standing
to challenge the search, since there was "a reasonable expectation of free-
dom from governmental intrusion.""9 The official "could reasonably have
expected that only [union officers] and their personal or business guests
would enter the office, and that records would not be touched except with
their permission or that of union higher-ups."'
Search Incident to an Arrest. It is basic that an exploratory search is illegal
under the Federal Constitution. A search incident to an arrest is an excep-
tion to this command and is permitted only under the limitations devel-
oped by the Supreme Court with respect to the purpose and product of
the search. The Court has noted three reasons for allowing an officer to
search an arrested person or the immediate area: (1) to protect the officer;
(2) to prevent the escape of the accused; and (3) to prevent the destruc-
tion of evidence."' With respect to ordinary traffic offenses, the danger in-
volved to the officer is minimal, escape is virtually impossible, and there is
no evidence to be destroyed. In Lane v. State,' however, the Texas court
of criminal appeals seemed to ignore these facts. The officer, upon making
a lawful arrest for speeding, conducted a search of the automobile. A pis-
tol which was found was later used to convict the driver of unlawfully
carrying a weapon. Since the officer ordered the defendant to get out of the
vehicle, and then, ignoring person of the defendant, began a search of the
8
7 id. at 103.
3'392 U.S. 364 (1968).
"
2 Id. at 368.
40 Id. at 369.
41 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); see cases collected in Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d
314 (1966).
42424 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968).
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automobile, it appears his purpose was to make an exploratory search. Nev-
ertheless, the Texas court upheld the conviction, explicitly stating that all
peace officers have the right to search incidental to a lawful arrest. Judge
Morrison dissented on the ground that even in a search incident to an ar-
rest the search must be confined to the purposes previously stated by the
United States Supreme Court.'
Although Lane seems clearly incorrect, an officer may search an automo-
bile after an arrest for a traffic offense when probable cause for a more ex-
tensive search develops upon arrest. For example, a lawful search for al-
cohol may be conducted when the driver's actions reflect that he was driv-
ing while intoxicated. The officer, under those circumstances, has con-
ducted the search to prevent the destruction of fruits or instrumentalities
of the new offense and not the original traffic violation.
The search of an automobile after an arrest for an offense more serious
than a traffic violation presents additional problems. The United States
Supreme Court long ago held that an automobile, because of its ambula-
tory nature, may be searched without a warrant." It follows that if the
automobile is no longer mobile the reason for the warrantless search van-
ishes. Thus the 1964 case of Preston v. United States' held that when an
automobile is impounded by the police and searched thereafter, a warrant
is required. It seems possible, however, that just as a gun used in the com-
mission of a crime can be examined ballistically without a warrant, so an
impounded automobile which was used in the commission of a crime can be
examined without a warrant. This "instrument of the crime" theory ap-
peared in Harris v. United States.' An automobile suspected of being used
in a robbery was being inventoried pursuant to a departmental regulation
which required the police, for caretaking purposes, to search each such
vehicle thoroughly to remove all valuables, and to place an informational
tag pertaining thereto on the car. It was raining, and when the officer
opened a door to roll up the window, a registration card belonging to the
victim was discovered. The card was later used in the trial which resulted
in the defendant's conviction. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
card was the fruit of an illegal search. The government argued that the
" Lane was followed by the Texas court in Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968), although Judges Morrison and Onion dissented. Id. at 68. In Grundstrom v. Beto, 273
F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Tex. 1967), however, a federal district court sitting in Dallas held that such
an exploratory search of an automobile was prohibited by the fourth amendment. As pointed out
in the dissenting opinion in Lane, 424 S.W.2d at 928, the Lane decision is in conflict with prac-
tically all jurisdictions. See 10 A.L.R.3d 314 (1966). See also Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d
386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960), where the search of the arrested party's
person was sustained but a random search pursuant to an arrest for a minor traffic violation was
condemned. Whether or not a search of the automobile incidental to the traffic arrest is reasonable
would appear necessarily to depend upon all the circumstances. The burden would seem to fall on
the prosecution to show these circumstances. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Robinson
v. State, 444 P.2d 845 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968), allowed a search of the automobile of the de-
fendant who was arrested for speeding, but the court emphasized the facts surrounding the arrest,
namely, the arresting officer's knowledge that the defendant had carried concealed weapons on prior
occasions and, under such circumstances, the policeman "had a right and a duty to search the
defendant and for immediate presence of any offensive weapons." Id. at 847. See Amador-Gonzalez
v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
4' 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
4 370 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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automobile, as an instrument of the crime, could be subjected to a lawful
warrantless search. On the first hearing, before a three-judge panel, the
court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that use in the commis-
sion of a crime does not exempt the search of an item from the strictures
of the fourth amendment. On a rehearing en banc, this determination was
vacated, and the conviction was upheld on the ground that when the
officer viewed the card he was not actually making a search, but was mere-
ly protecting the automobile. The Supreme Court affirmed the latter dis-
position per curiam," upholding the basis of the decision without any dis-
cussion of the validity of the departmental regulation. However, the
decision in Harris does not seem to afford officers a rationale for circum-
venting the Preston doctrine since the Court took particular pains to dis-
tinguish between the acts of the officer protecting the car and those con-
stituting the search for valuables.
Motion To Suppress. In Simmons v. United States"' the Supreme Court held
that a defendant may testify at a motion to suppress hearing without fear
that such testimony may be admitted against him at trial. The Court noted
that a defendant need not relinquish his right to remain silent in order
to assert a fourth amendment right."
II. CONFRONTATION
The right to face one's adversaries was strengthened in recent cases."
In Bruton v. United States' the Court overruled Delli Paoli v. United
States," which held that in a joint trial the admission of an incriminating
extra-judicial statement of one co-defendant implicating the other as well
as himself was constitutionally permissible. In Delli Paoli the Court had
assumed that the encroachment upon the right to confrontation could be
eliminated by an instruction to the jury. Bruton, following the rationale
of Jackson v. Denno," took the more realistic position that the jury could
not be expected to ignore prejudicial matter that they had just heard, and
held that the defendant's right to cross-examination as secured by the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment was violated despite an in-
struction to the jury. The effect of Bruton on inadmissible hearsay is not
settled. Bruton is fully retroactive and applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment."
47 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam).
4'390 U.S. 377 (1968).
"' On the same basic rationale the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recently held that a parolee's statements at a revocation hearing cannot be later used at a trial on
the issue of guilt, in reliance upon Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), and Simmons.
Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
" Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Garafolo v.
United States, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Roberts v.
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
5' 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
52352 U.S. 232 (1957).
53378 U.S. 368 (1964).
'
4 Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
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The principles of Pointer v. Texas5 were fortified in Barber v. Page,'"
where recorded preliminary hearing testimony of a state's witness was ad-
mitted on the ground that he was unavailable because of his absence from
the state. The Supreme Court assumed that Barber's attorney had the op-
portunity to cross-examine the absent witness in the preliminary hearing.
Nevertheless, the Court held that a witness is not "unavailable" as an ex-
ception to the confrontation right unless the enforcement authorities have
made a good faith effort to obtain his presence at the trial.
III. COMPETENCY
In Townsend v. State' the Texas court of criminal appeals, following
the dictates of Pate v. Robinson,8 defined procedural guidelines for the
determination of competency to stand trial. Prior to the 1965 revision of
the Code of Criminal Procedure a preliminary hearing to determine com-
petency to stand trial was available upon request accompanied by allega-
tions of incompetency. Article 46.02 of the amended Code severely limits
this procedure by requiring the consent of the prosecutor and the trial
judge."9 The question in Townsend arose when the prosecutor would not
give his consent to a hearing. The court held that where a timely demand
for a preliminary hearing supported by sufficient evidence is denied for
want of consent, the trial judge is under a duty, after the selection of the
jury for the trial on the merits, to afford the accused a hearing on his com-
petency. Under such a procedure the same jury could possibly pass on
competency, guilt or innocence, and even punishment. It takes little imag-
ination to see the possibility of prejudice in a procedure which allows evi-
dence inadmissible in the trial on guilt to be heard by the jury in the hear-
ing on competency.
IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION: CONFESSIONS
The judicial procrastination referred to earlier in this Article is illus-
trated by Charles v. State."° The majority held, despite the fact that there
was no evidence that defendant affirmatively waived his Miranda rights,
that the Texas statutes in force at the time of the confession afforded suf-
ficient procedural safeguards to satisfy Miranda's "other fully effective
means" substitute for the specific warnings. Further, the majority ex-
pressed "utmost faith that the rights of appellant as well as the rights of
society will be protected by the [United States] Supreme Court."'" The
dissent of Judge Onion emphasized that even providing "other fully ef-
fective means" did not exempt the prosecution from establishing a volun-
tary waiver. In regard to the adequacy of the statutory warnings, Judge
Onion concluded that "[w]hat the majority still fails to grasp, the Texas
"380 U.S. 400 (1965).
5'390 U.S. 719 (1968).
57427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
58383 U.S. 375 (1966).
"
9 TEx. CODE CRrM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02 (1966).
60424 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).61 Id. at 921.
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Legislature was quick to realize" in subsequently requiring the Miranda
waiver. 2 Moreover, he felt that giving an "opportunity" to the Supreme
Court of the United States to review the conviction ignored the expen-
sive burden placed upon the defendant and the impossibility of the
Court's reviewing all questions.
It appears to be established in Texas that absence of an express statement
as to waiver of Miranda rights is not determinative of the question of
waiver. In Gonzales v. State"3 the court of criminal appeals held that a
completely voluntary, written, signed confession, even though it did not
contain an express statement of waiver, was admissible. In McCandless v.
State" the same court held that waiver of the right to retained counsel,
shown by the written confession and the inferences to be drawn from the
totality of the circumstances, reflected waiver of the right to appointed
counsel. Thus there was no need for an express statement of such waiver.
Although the written statement's preamble, which referred to waiver, was
considered of great significance, it does not appear that the McCandless
opinion is grounded solely upon the appearance of a waiver in the written
confession. Such reasoning would ignore the fact that Miranda is directed
toward custodial interrogation as well as the ultimate signed confession.
In Hill v. State" the court held that Miranda does not require that fur-
ther interrogation must cease once an accused has stated that he is at-
tempting to retain counsel, where there is no evidence of improper police
behavior, and in his confession the accused voluntarily waives his right to
counsel.
V. DISCOVERY
The basis for disclosure of a grand jury transcript is the United States
Supreme Court decision of Dennis v. United States." Dennis apparently
does not command disclosure of a witness's grand jury testimony prior to
the time that he testifies at trial, since the grand jury transcript could be
used only for the purpose of impeachment or to test the witness's credi-
bility."7 But the requirement that the testimony be produced at trial can-
not be circumvented, according to Melton v. United States,"' by the simple
expedient of not transcribing the reporter's notes of the grand jury pro-
ceedings. In Melton the defendant made a timely motion for production
of the grand jury testimony. The Tenth Circuit held that the particular-
ized need was shown when the request was made for the reason that its
production "will give us an opportunity to establish an inconsistency."
"
2 Id. at 922.
68 4 2 9 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
64425 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
5429 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
86384 U.S. 855 (1966).
"'See Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1968). In Texas it is clear that the de-
fendant has no absolute right to the production of such transcribed testimony prior to trial. Mc-
Duff v. State, 431 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Bryant v. State, 423 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1968).




The fact that the notes had not been transcribed was held no basis for re-
fusal to produce.
VI. PUNISHMENT
Increase of Penalty on Retrial. Three federal circuit courts" have indicated
that on the retrial of a reversed conviction the defendant does not have a
right to receive no greater sentence than he received at the first trial. The
Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, reached a contrary conclusion in
Patton v. North Carolina." The Patton court held that the increase of sen-
tence following a successful appeal and conviction after retrial was a viola-
tion of a defendant's rights under the equal protection, due process, and
double jeopardy clauses of the Federal Constitution. Certiorari was granted
by the Supreme Court on October 28, 1968, in North Carolina v. Pearce"2
to decide the question of whether or not the constitution prevents a state
court from sentencing a defendant to a longer term of imprisonment at
the second trial, so the inconsistency generated by the circuit courts may
soon be laid to rest.
73
Recidivism. Under the Gideon doctrine any conviction is void where the
defendant was not represented by counsel and did not waive his right to
counsel.74 Consequently, no such conviction may be used for enhancement
purposes. In Ex parte Kellion 5 an enhanced life sentence imposed in 1939
was reversed by the court of criminal appeals because the petitioner was
not represented by counsel at the primary conviction or at the time of the
prior conviction used for enhancement. In Cox v. State71 the court held
that informing the jury of defendant's five prior convictions alleged for
enhancement prior to jury deliberation on guilt or innocence was not re-
versible error where no timely objection was made. An admission by the
defendant on cross-examination that he had been convicted previously of
the offense was held in Jones v. State" not to relieve the state of the bur-
den of establishing the prior conviction. Clark v. State" held that the hear-
ing provided under article 40.0979 to allow the record to "speak the truth"
cannot be used to attack a prior conviction used for enhancement pur-
poses, since the provision has no bearing upon the case after it has been
closed, judgment rendered, and sentence pronounced.
71United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1059 (1968);
United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 889
(1967); Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
7'381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968).
12268 N.C. 708, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966), cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 258 (1968).
73 See Honigsberg, Limitations Upon Increasing a Defendant's Sentence Following a Successful
Appeal and Reconviction, 4 CRIM. L. ]BULL. 329 (1968).
"4Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7'422 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). See also Ex parte Stevenson, 422 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1968).
76422 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
77422 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). A stipulation personally entered into by the de-
fendant is sufficient to relieve the state of the necessity of further proof of a prior conviction.
Steward v. State, 422 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
78424 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).7 9
Tnx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09 (1966).
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VII. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Trial. In Ex parte Meadows"° the Texas court of criminal appeals held
that where appointed counsel is not allowed the statutory8' ten days for
preparation and no written waiver of the right is given, the attorney must
nevertheless make a request for additional time for preparation before
relief can be granted. The court noted that even though the statute is
violated the defendant must show that the violation deprived him of a fair
trial. It is important to note, however, that the court's holding applies only
to a collateral attack on an otherwise valid conviction. The same court
held in Stewart v. State"" that a showing on direct appeal of a failure to
allow the mandatory ten days for preparation is grounds for reversal.
Ex parte Engle"8 held that the fact that an attorney has not paid his bar
dues at the time of appointment is no longer grounds for reversal of the
conviction where there is no showing that counsel was ineffective. In Ex
parte Breen"4 the Texas court ignored decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States " in denying relief to a petitioner whose appeal was based
upon the failure of the indigent's counsel to request that a statement of
facts be prepared. Judge Onion in his dissent appeared to adopt the cor-
rect position that petitioner was denied his constitutional right to counsel
on appeal and that he should be entitled to an out-of-time appeal.
Parole-Probation. One petitioning for parole has no right to counsel, re-
gardless of his financial position, since nothing is being taken from him. "
However, a probation revocation does take away one's liberty and the
United States Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay" has held that the right
to counsel in a probation hearing is constitutionally protected. The Texas
court of criminal appeals refused, in Crawford v. State," to give retro-
activity to Mempa. However, prior to consideration of motion for rehear-
ing, the United States Supreme Court decided that retroactivity was in-
herent in the principles of Mempa,"8 as in any other right to counsel case.
Thus on the motion for rehearing Crawford was reversed and remanded. 0
VIII. IDENTIFICATION
In Stovall v. Denno1 the United States Supreme Court held that in a
case involving fair identification procedures, the burden is on the defend-
ant to show that the method used resulted in such unfairness that his right
80418 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
81TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(b) (1966).
82422 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
8a4 1 8 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
84420 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
85Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 228 (1968); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
88 Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968).
17389 U.S. 128 (1967).
88No. 41466 (Tex. Crim. App., Oct. 9, 1968), motion for rehearing granted Nov. 27, 1968.
8Sstiltner v. Rhay, 89 S. Ct. 32 (1968); McConnell v. Rhay, 89 S. Ct. 32 (1968).
'0 Crawford v. State, No. 41466 (Tex. Crim. App., Oct. 9, 1968), motion for rehearing grant-
ed Nov. 27, 1968.
9' 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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to due process of law was infringed. Applying this standard in Graham
v. State,2 the Texas court of criminal appeals held that
since the witnesses had an adequate opportunity to view the defendant during
the crime, and the defendant failed to show any suggestive influence by the
police during lineup procedures during which the witnesses identified the
defendant, the subsequent courtroom identification was not improper.
In Moore v. State3 the trial court rejected the request that the defend-
ant be allowed to stand among other persons of the same general age, race,
and sex when being identified by a witness. 4 The court of criminal ap-
peals affirmed, holding that a defendant may be lawfully compelled to sit
at the defense counsel's table when being identified." The court further
noted that the state's counsel is not prohibited from pointing to the de-
fendant and describing his appearance in the presence of witnesses.
IX. JURY SELECTION
In Witherspoon v. Illinois" the Illinois statute under attack provided:
"In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who
shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against
capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same."' 7 The United States
Supreme Court held that, although the exclusion of jurors who are op-
posed to capital punishment does not affect the determination of guilt,
the death penalty may not be imposed by a jury that was chosen by ex-
cluding persons who voiced general objections to the death penalty. The
Court made it unmistakably clear that the decision would have no appli-
cation to the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors who state that they
would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment
without regard to evidence developed at the trial or that their attitude
toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt. Bumper v. North Carolina" makes it
clear that Witherspoon does not affect the validity of any sentence other
than one of death. Although Witherspoon is fully retroactive, its effect
upon Texas practice is likely to be slight."
92422 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
9'424 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
'4 Id. at 444.
"s See generally P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965).
"391 U.S. 510 (1968).
"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959), repealed.
"8391 U.S. 543 (1968).
"Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
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